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0. C. ADAmSON II**
.Rules which lead to the exclusion of evidence are two-edged
swords. They may greatly aid a party in one case and have a
devastating effect in the next. Thus, while this article is written
from the viewpoint of those attorneys who quite often find them-
selves on the side of the defense, it is almost impossible to generalize
concerning the desirability or undesirability of any particular rule
from the defense standpoint. This fact is even more apparent when
comparison is made to the compaion article in which the view-
point of the plaintiff is set forth. Perhaps it is not too surprising that
offensive and defensive interests coincide more often than collide -
and rightly so, for one should not be so blinded by the exigencies of
a particular situation that he cannot recognize the propriety and
value of an evidentiary rule in different situations.
Also, the potential advantage a rule may have for a particular
side is not of controlling importance by itself. The sole criterion
should not be expediency. In any bona fide litigation, both parties
shwuld be engaged in a search for truth. Ideally, it is only where
common experience teaches that a certain type of evidence is usually
unreliable that it should not be considered. And it is only where the
admission of testimony is contrary to public policy that the ideal of
the search for truth should be temporarily abandoned. Consequently,
while the following comments are made on an avowedly partisan
basis, it is also intended that they express something more than a
narrow bias born of selfish interests.
LImITED ADmiSSBILITY
Rule 61 provides that where evidence is admissible as to one
party and inadmissible as to the other parties, upon request the trial
judge sludl restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly. This rule deals with the fairly common problem
of evidence being used to the prejudice of a party concerning whom
it is obviously inadmissible. Usually this party is a co-defendant.
The excuse is that the evidence is admissible against another party
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
**Member of the Minnesota, Member, Judicial Council Committee on
Appellate Procedure.
1. Unless othervise qualified, "Rule," as used herein, refers to the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence (U. R_ E.).
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to the suit. Often enough, this evidence is admitted on some tech-
nical basis and the real motive is not the avowed purpose, but to
cause harm to the case of the adverse party against whom alone it
could not be used. The rule does not strike at the evil directly but
requires the trial judge to do his best to prevent the harm. The rem-
edy is more fictional than real. The ideal juror may wipe from his
mind incorrect inferences from such evidence upon proper instruc-
tions from the judge, but experience indicates that once a juror has
heard damaging evidence he will retain the harmful impressions
despite any so-called curative instructions.
The real danger in this rule is that it may be construed to permit,
without regard to other available remedies, the admission of what
should be! inadmissible evidence.2 The Rules of Civil Procedure
permit almost unlimited joinder of claims and parties.3 Added to
this are liberal provisions for counterclaims, 4 cross-claims,ri mi-
pleader 6 and intervention. 7 Now, more than ever, there is an in-
creased possibility of the technically correct admission of evidence
which may be very harmful to other claims or parties involved in
the same trial. It follows that this rule should not be considered as
an alternative to Minn. R. Civ P 20.02 which grants the privilege
of separate trials as to both claims or parties where injustice would
result from a combined trial.
Rule 6 is subject to the further criticism that it does not require
the trial judge to explain to the jury the reason for the admission
of the evidence at the time it is presented to the jury This require-
ment would provide better protection to the party harmed by the
evidence. An instruction concerning this problem which is given for
the first time during the court's charge to the jury is often lost in
the welter of other instructions and possibly increases the confusion
in the jury's mind.
PRESUMPTIONS
It is extremely difficult within the limited scope of this article
to do more than scratch the surface of this involved and intricate
problem. The main difficulty is one of definition. Once it is known
exactly what kind of presumption is under discussion, the amnimal
may be dissected and analyzed with comparative ease. The author
who does this may always be subject to the criticism that he picked
2. In this connection, see Rule 45, discussed in ra.







too big, or too small, or too nebulous an animal for analysis. To
avoid this problem, -the "presumptions" discussed here are those
defined by Rule 13,8 i.e., the situation where a rule of law provides
that a (presumed) fact may be assumed when another (basic) fact
is found to exist. The basic fact may be established by a jury's find-
ing, by judicial notice, by agreement of the parties, or by some
other accepted method. If the basic fact is not established, then
nothing may be presumed and the problem ceases to exist.
Rule 14 divides this type of presumption into two categories:
(a) where the basic facts tend to prove the assumed fact, and (b)
where the basic facts, in and of themselves, do not tend to prove
the fact to be assumed therefrom. The rule provides that class (b)
presumptions vanish from the case as soon as evidence is introduced
contrary to the existence of the presumed fact. To this extent Rule
14 would preserve the doctrine of Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.9 However, the rule also provides that class (a) presumptions
continue to exist despite contrary evidence, and the party against
whom presumptions exist has the burden of establishing the non-
existence of the presumed fact. In such situations the Ryan rule
would be abolished as to a large class of presumptions. This dis-
tinction should not be made and the rule of the Ryan case should be
retained in all situations whether or not basic facts have any pro-
bative value as evidence of the presumed fact.
First of all, the distinction is rather artificial and the courts
constantly will have to determine which type of presumption is
involved before the next step may be taken. This determination is
often a perplexing matter. It is difficult to think of any recognized
presumption which does not have some type of rational connection
to the basic facts which gave it birth. This point is illustrated in the
cases where it is claimed that statutory presumptions constitute a
denial of due process, or some similar constitutional provision. One
such case is State v. Kelly, 0 where a divided court held unconsti-
tutional a statute that possession of liquor in a dry county supported
a presumption that defendant had the liquor for the purpose of
illegal sale in the county. The court quoted with approval the
8. Rule 13 does not cover mere permissive inferences such as res ipsa
loquitur (Minn. R. Civ. P 43.06), or so-called conclusive or irrebutable
presumptions.
9. 206 Minn. 562, 289 W. W. 557 (1939). An excellent review of the
rather rough handling of the Ryan rule in subsequent cases may be found in
TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 486-93, 53 N. AV. 2d 468, 471-74 (1952).
For a view opposing the Ryan rule see companion article by Gausewitz, p. 33.
-10. 218 MAinn 247, 15 N. W. 2d 554 (1944).
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doctrine previously announced by the United States Supreme
Court .11
"'Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sis-
tamed if there be no rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection be-
tween the two in common experience where the inference is
so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circum-
stances of life as we know them it is not competent for the legis-
lature to create it as a rule govermng the procedure of courls,'"
218 Minn. at 253-54, 15 N. W 2d at 559 (Emphasis supplied
by the Minnesota Court.)
In most of these cases, the courts have not had an easy time in de-
ciding whether there exists the "rational connection" necessary
for constitutionality While this test is perhaps somewhat broader
than the class (a) test of Rule 14 (i.e., whether the basic facts "have
any probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed
fact"), the two tests are similar enough to demonstrate the problems
involved.
For example, take the presumption of due care on the part of a
decedent .1 2 Is this presumption a class (b) presumption which
under Rule 14 vanishes from the case as soon as evidence is intro-
duced that the decedent was negligent,' 3 or does it belong in class
(a) and remain vital throughout the case? Usually, the basic facts
prove the decedent got into an automobile and was killed while
driving. They do not tend to prove anything at all about the conduct
of the deceased driver. 4 But it may be argued that this presumption
is quite similar to the presumption against suicide. It is based upon
the idea that decedent acted in accord with the natural law of self
preservation and consequently he must have driven with due care.
If an analogy may be drawn between the two presumptions, then
11. Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467-68 (1943) (statute providing
that possession of gun'by one previously convicted of crime of violence gives
rise to presumption that he obtained the gun in interstate commerce contrary
to law, held unconstitutional).
12. See TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W 2d 468 (1952).
13. There is the interesting question of the constitutionality of coimion
law or court-created "class (b)" presumptions. By definition, in this type
of presumption there is no real connection between basic fact and presumed
fact. Thus, such presumptions would be unconstitutional if created by the
legislature.
14. If the due care presumption has no basis in human experience (as
demonstrated by the fact that the surviving driver has no presumption to aid
him in justifying conduct identical to that of a decedent), then the presump-
tion must rest solely upon the inability of the decedent to testify. The trial
court instructed the jury to that effect in Bimberg v. Northern Pacific Ry.,
217 Minn. 187, 197, 14 N. W 2d 410, 419 (1944). However, in State v.
Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15 N. W 2d 554 (1944), the court held that a statutory




a real controversy may exist as to the proper classification of the due
care presumption.15
Since the division of presumptions into troublesome categories
undoubtedly will provide a fertile field for confusion and error,
what prevailing policy reason exists in support of the division? The
excuse usually offered is that the jury should be told that it can give
special consideration to the general human experience upon which
the presumption is based.16 If a presumption is truly the result of
human learning and common experience, will not the jurors as
adult humans share that knowledge without extra prompting? Will
not express instructions on the point magnify the rational connection
between the basic facts and presumed fact so that the probative force
of the basic facts is emphasized far beyond the experience which
gave root to the presumption ?17
Suppose a written statement is taken from an injured person
several days after an accident. When that statement later becomes
material in a lawsuit, it is subject to Minn. Stat. § 602.01 (1953)
which declares that it is "presumably fraudulent." This statute was
supposedly- passed to protect injured persons from investigation
before they have made sufficient recovery to look after their own
interests. Thus, the basic fact has some probative connection with
the presumed fact. This statutory presumption would fall into class
(a) under Rule 14. As a consequence, it would remain a factor in
the case under the U. R. E. even though it was shown that the
injury caused no discomfort, no drugs or opiates were involved,
and no sharp practice was used to obtain the voluntary statement.
Further, under Rule 14, the jury would be told of the presumption
of fraud and also told that the party seeking to use the statement has
the burden of proving good faith. It is quite probable that after this
procedure the jury would no longer view the taking of this state-
ment in the light of their common experience on such matters, but
15. In various decisions, the presumptions of due care and accidental
death were treated as "class (a)" presumptions, the jury being told that the
presumption stands until they are persuaded to the contrary. See, e.g., Lewis
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P. 2d 579 (1942) ; Karp v.
Herder, 181 Wash. 583, 44 P. 2d 808 (1935).
16. Morgan, Some Observations Concenitng Prestmptions, 44 Harn. 1.
Rev. 906 (1931).
17 TIs point was recognized in Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 206 Minn. 562, 568-69, 289 N. W. 557, 560 (1939)
"It follows that if the case is one for the jurors the presumption should
not be submitted as something to which they may attach probative force.
The weight of the evidence is for them, to be ascertained oit the scales
of their experience and judgment, rather than those of the judge. It would
be an intrusion into their field to suggest that they substitute for any real
evidence, or any reasonable inference therefrom, the assumed weight of
something which is not in evidence." (Emphas sttpPlied.)
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would feel that there was something basically insidious about the
whole affair regardless of the specific evidence of no fraud.'
The matter becomes worse when some of the common presump-
tions of the crimnal law are involved. Consider the presumption that
a person having the possession of stolen goods is the thief. " ,
Again, this would be a class (a) presumption because possession of
loot does tend to prove a connection with the theft. Should this
presumption remain in a case after defendant has offered consider-
able proof that he made a bona fide purchase of the property?
Should the jury be told that there is a presumption that the defend-
ant stole and that he has the burden of proving that he did not ?2
Minnesota recognizes many presumptions. The legislature is
adding new ones unceasingly Many of these obviously would be-
long in class (a) of Rule 14. Most others would be on the border-
line between classes (a) and (b) Every time a borderline presump-
tion is in issue the trial court will have to stop to construe Rule 14
in the light of the background of the presumption. The practitioner
will not know the true status of these presumptions until the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has had an opportunity to rule on each of them.
Since Minnesota, 2 1 in accord with the great weight of authority,ii
now treats all presumptions in the manner prescribed by Rule 14
for class (b) presumptions only, the adoption of this rule would
work a real revolution in procedure and thinking. It would mark
a sharp departure into a field of obvious difficulty, resulting in the
overemphasis of most presumptions giving them an illogical and
irrational importance far greater than the common sense which
originally supported them. The distinction between class (a) and
(b) presumptions should be deleted from Rule 14. The rule should
treat all presumptions as class (b) matters. Once there is evidence
in the case contrary to the presumed fact, that fact should be litigated
as any other fact or issue unaided and unsupported by any shifting
of the burden of proof or by any judicial pronouncements.
18. In Koenigs v. Thome, 226 Minn. 14, 31 N. W 2d 534 (1948). and
Swanson v. Swanson, 196 Minn. 298, 265 N. W 39 (1936), both "fraudulent"
statement cases, the court held that the presumption vamshed as soon as there
was evidence of no fraud. These cases would be overruled by Rule 14.
19. See State v. Hutchison, 121 Minn. 405, 141 N. W 483 (1913)
20. In criminal proceedings, the conflict of presumptions with the obli-
gation of the state to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is supposedly
solved by Rule 16.
21. E.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler, 235 Minn. 292, 50 N. W 2d 707 (1951)
(presumption that purchaser is solvent and able to perform obligation),
Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120, 55 N. W 2d 691 (1952) (presumption of gift
between husband and wife), TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W 2d
468 (1952) (presumption of due care).
22. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (3d ed. 1940), Thayer, Prelimi-
nary Treatise on Evidence 313-52 (1898).
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WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY AND IMPEACHMENT
Rule 17 provides that the judge may disqualify a witness if be
finds that the witness cannot understand questions or answer them
or if the witness does not understand the duty to tell the truth. This
rule should contain a provision requiring the judge to investigate
in private to determine the basic competency, as distinguished
from credibility, of the witness. Especially in the case of young
children, the examination in open court of the child's understanding
often provides an unnecessary exhibition which may affect the
jury's thinking beyond the testimony ultimately given by the witness.
Rule 19 is a poor attempt to codify the rule that it is necessary
to lay a general foundation for testimony. At best, Rule 19 is
superfluous and its deletion from the code would detract nothing.
At worst, the last two sentences are somewhat ambiguous. They
apparently give the trial court a greater right to interfere in such
matters than is now commonly accepted. The last sentence is
especially bad since it allows the introduction of testimony without
foundation with the hope that the foundation will later be supplied.
This rule could be used to get much unqualified and baseless testi-
mony before the jury. Once the jury has heard this testimony, it
may not be "stricken" from their minds by command of the trial
judge. When the necessary foundation is not proved, the court's
instruction to the jury to disregard testimony is of little value. If the
jury should not have testimony, they should not hear it. It should
not be admitted and than later supposedly forgotten. The best
solution to the whole matter would be the elimination of Rule 19 in
its entirety from the U. R. E.
Rules 20, 21 and 22 cover the subject of credibility and impeach-
ment of a witness. It is difficult to determine what Rule 20 means.
It provides that either party may cross-examine a witness concern-
ing "any conduct by him and other matter" relevant to his credi-
bility, in addition to the use of extrinsic evidence for such a purpose.
To the extent that the rule means that a party is not "bound by the
testimony" of a witness called by him, the rule is good and makes
no change in present practice.2 3 Beyond that point, some difficult
problems arise. Suppose a witness is called and gives testimony
adverse to the party calling him. If the witness is not hostile and
the testimony is no surprise, should the door be opened for an
attack on credibility? If so, Rule 20 would permit a very undesirable
practice contrary to the restrictions of Minn. R. Civ. P 43.02 and
23. E.g., Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N. W 58 (1893).
19561
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prior Minnesota practice.2 4 Also, may a party call a witness and
by cross-examiation go into the credibility of a witness before such
credibility is i issue 2  Further, what is meant by "extrinsic evi-
dence" in connection with bolstering the witness ? Rule 20 should
be clarified and its scope expressly limited, especially in reference
to the rehabilitation of a witness. Besides being unusually vague, the
rule is much too broad. To accomplish the avowed purpose of the
rule, the door is opened to all types of evidence and unlimited
examination which may be used to defeat the purpose of the rule.
The present practice is simple, clear, and well understood. It keeps
the collateral issue of credibility within reasonable bounds and
should be retained.
Rule 21 also modifies present practice. It provides that evidence
of a conviction of a witness for a crime "not involving dishonesty
or false statement" is inadmissible on the issue of the witness' credi-
bility Under present practice, conviction of any crime may be
so used.2 6 The distinction which the rule attempts to create is
supposedly logical. However, the determination of what is a crime
involving dishonesty is bound to be troublesome. The commission
of statutory rape may involve as much dishonesty and lying as
perjury or embezzlement or some similar crime. Will it be necessary
to go into the facts of every conviction to determine whether "dis-
honesty" was involved ? It would be better to preserve the present
statutory rule. There should be no division of crimes into classes for
this purpose. If a witness has done something which is criminally
wrong, the jury should have the right to believe that the person
might also be immoral when it comes to testifying.
Rule 22 is undesirable. Clause (a) provides that a witness need
not be confronted with a prior inconsistent written statement before
being questioned about the statement. Clause (b) apparently per-
mits the introduction of a contradictory written statement even
though the witness was not examined about it or its contents.
It is impossible, within the limited scope of this article, to dis-
cuss the various views concerning impeachment of a witness who is
not a party 27 While impeachment of this type is not considered sub-
stantive evidence and will not sustain the burden of proof,28 the jury
24. In State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 57 N. W 2d 419 (1953),
mere adverse testimony held insufficient basis for attack on credibility.
25. Minn. R. Civ. P 43.02 permits impeachment of a party or his em-
ployee only on "material matters."
26. Minn. Stat. § 610.49 (1953).
27 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1025-39 (3d ed. 1940).
28. Compare Williams v. Jayne, 210 Minn. 594, 299 N. W 853 (1941)
(impeachment of party), with In re Estate of Olson, 227 Minn. 289, 35 N. W
2d 439 (1948) (impeachment of witness not a party).
[Vol. 40:347
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is likely to accept the impeachment as proof of the facts concerned
regardless of the court's instructions. It follows that a complete
foundation of the statement should be laid in order that all present,
including the witness and the jury, will understand the matter. As
soon as counsel in his own words attempts to paraphrase the alleged
statement in the form of questions, the whole context and meaning
of the statement may be varied. The witness should know exactly
the statement he is being questioned about so that he may remember
what he said, and how and where he said it. He should have the
opportunity to deny the statement, or part thereof. If he wishes
to affirm it, he should have the opportunity of then explaining what
he meant by it. Counsel should not be allowed to hurl verbal innuen-
does of former contradictory statements without tying the matter
down to the actual contents and context of the statement involved.
Further, if the witness is not questioned about such a statement,
this statement should not be subsequently used. If it is so used, the
confusion and delay will result in no'great advantage to either side.
Suppose a witness is called and he testifies that it was raining at
some material time. He previously wrote a letter stating that the
day was clear. If on cross-examination he is asked whether he
previously stated it was not raining, the witness may be completely
at sea. If he is shown the letter, he may admit his error or point out
why the letter is apparently inaccurate. If the letter or statement is
not mentioned at all but is introduced by calling the recipient, then
the "impeached" witness must be subsequently recalled and the
letter explained. This may be days after the matter first arose. Either
all value of the impeachment will lost, or valid rehabilitation will
be of no avail. The present practice of requiring a foundation for the
impeachment of a witness, who is not a party, works well and is
easily understood by the jury. It should not be changed.
While the following suggestion is not exactly in point, perhaps
Rule 22 should also contain an express prohibition that on cross-
examination purported oral or written statements may not be incor-
porated in questions of counsel unless it can be proved by independ-
ent, competent evidence that such statements were made. This
abuse occurs in an extreme form where a cross-examining attorney
asks a witness, "Did you not tell me thus and so?" The jury under-
stands the question as a fact. The witness denies- the statement.
No further evidence is offered to prove the alleged statement. By
this means, an unscrupulous attorhey can cast great doubts on the
veracity-of a witness and can supply missing "facts" in the jurors'
minds without proving them. It is felt that the phraseology of
1956]
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Rule 22 will extend rather than curtail the use of this improper
technique. No impeachment should be allowed unless an adequate
foundation is laid beforehand and unless it can be proved by subse-
quent testimony
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Rules 23 through 40 deal with various privileges. Only one of
these rules, Rule 27, is discussed here.29 The rule concerns the physi-
cian-patient privilege which probably results in more litigation
than any similar exclusionary rule. This privilege did not exist at
common law"0 and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, in reversing its 1950 decision to preserve the
common law rule in the U. R. E.,31 did a great disservice to the law
Of all the privileges, this privilege has the least justification in
logic and morals, and results in more questionable verdicts than
any other rule of competency Supposedly, the privilege was adopted
to enable people to secure needed medical treatment and advice
without fear or embarrassment. Thus, a person could obtain care
without public disclosure of intimate facts. However, a brief reading
of the decisions under the present Minnesota statute2 indicates that
the privilege is never asserted to prevent embarrassment of the
type described above. Rather, it is used to prevent the introduction
of evidence contrary to the testimony of the privileged party or his
chosen medical witness, concerning which the privileged party is
singularly unembarrassed. Illustrative of these cases are Palmer v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers,88 Stone v. Sigel,14 and
Ostrowsks v. Mockridge.15
The Palmer case involved a suit on an accident policy which
covered death not due to carbon monoxide poisoning The decedent
was found lying in a garage alongside an automobile with the motor
running. Two physicians were summoned but were unable to revivc
him. It was not known whether he died before or after the physicians
arrived. At the trial, plaintiff produced medical experts who gave
the opinion, in answer to hypothetical questions, that decedent did
not die from carbon monoxide asphyxiation. These opinions as-
29. For discussion of other privileges see companion article. Louiwel
and Crippin, p. ..
30. Price v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co., 00 ,Mmi. 2(-1, 95
N. W 1118 (1903)
31. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 27, comment (National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1953)
32. Minn Stat. § 595.02(4) (1953).
33. 187 Minn. 272, 245 N. W 146 (1932).
34. 189 Minn. 47, 248 N. W 285 (1933)
35. 65 N. W 2d 185 (Minn. 1954).
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sumed that the decedent's skin was not a cherry red, a symptom of
carbon monoxide poisoning. Defendant sought to show by the testi-
mony of the attending physicians that decedent was, in fact, cherry
red. This testimony was ruled inadmissible as privileged even
though the individual may have been dead.
In the Stone case, one of the elements of plaintiff's claim was
a hernia allegedly received in the accident in issue. Plaintiff also
testified that she had not seen a physician for treatment for a long
time before the accident. After a verdict for plaintiff, it was dis-
covered that plaintiff had received treatment for the same hernia
prior to the accident. Defendant's motion for a new trial on the
basis of plaintiff's alleged perjury was denied since the newly dis-
covered evidence was privileged.
And in the Ostrowski case, plaintiff visited a physician the day
after an accident. She testified concerning the treatment given her
by this physician. Her medical expert gave his opinion concerning
plaintiff's condition in answer to a hypothetical question based
partly upon plaintiff's initial treatment. Yet, when defendant sought
to show by the first physician that he found no visible sign of bodily
injury the day following the accident, the testimony was excluded as
privileged.
In case such as these, the statutory privilege does not prevent
the forcible disclosure of personal medical affairs, for plaintiffs
have blandly brought these matters to public notice by testimony
in court. Rather, the statute operates only to prevent embarrassment
of a different sort-the disconcerting fact that the physicians who
are m the best position to know the truth disagree with plaintiff's
claim.
Finally, this privilege may be used to prevent the physician from
recounting admissions made to him by the patient concerning the
cause of physical injuries. While the facts of the accident may be
helpful or necessary to the physician, and while this disclosure may
be embarrassing to a patient in a later personal injury suit based
on different facts, there is no reason why public policy is served
by allowing the privilege to become an instrument of friud.
While the best rule would be the outright abolition of the privi-
lege, Rule 27 is a marked improvement over the present statute. In
effect, it adopts the reasoning rejected in Marfia v. Great Northern
Ry. Co.,3" that the privilege is waived when a lawsuit is started.
Rule 27(4) declares that there is no privilege in an action where the
36. 124 Minn. 466, 145 N. W. 385 (1914).
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"condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or
defense of the patient." Thus, if literally applied, when a person
begins a lawsuit claiming damages for injuries, all privilege as to
his physical condition ceases to operate. Thus, the worst evils of
the privilege are destroyed and the jury is allowed full access to all
the facts relevant to the claim.
OFFICIAL PRIVILEGE
One other privilege deserves mention. Rule 34 provides, in sub-
stance, that information given to an employee of the state may be
privileged if the legislature or the ,presiding judge feels that the
disclosure will be harmful to the interests of the government. 7 In
the broader sense, this rule countenances the immunity, granted by
statutes to various persons, from testifying to crucial facts. Illustra-
tive of these acts is Minn. Stat. § 169.06 (1953) which declares that
highway accident reports are privileged. The statute, in its present
form, permits an officer to testify to information within his knowl-
edge. In Rockwood v. Pierce,38 it was held that the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error in excluding information obtained by the
officer while investigating the accident even though this information
subsequently found its way into his reports. Even now, the exact
extent of the privilege provided by this statute remains in doubt.
The impact of Rule 34 will increase the difficulty of interpreting and
applying this and similar statutes. The rule apparently gives the
trial judge the power to exclude such testimony regardless of the
language of the statute if he feels that the evidence will be "harmful
to the interests" of the state, whatever that may mean. It may well
be that the state has an interest in obtaining accurate statistics on
many phases of human activity Is all statistical information obtained
for this purpose potentially incompetent depending upon the predi-
lections of the trial judge? Official information should be freely
admissible unless expressly prohibited by the legislature. The matter
should not be decided by hurried court room rulings. Also, § 169.06,
and similar legislation, should be repealed. It, like the physician-
patient privilege, affords an avenue for inaccuracy, misunderstand-
ing, and, on some occasions, outright perjury As in the case of
highway accident reports. the officer may lose his notes, or his
recollection of the events may become hazy and inaccurate. Yet, lie
cannot refresh his recollection from the report which he himself
made from information which he obtained. In effect, this statute
imposes upon the official the sole burden of preserving accurate,
37 Rule 34 is almost identical to Minn. Stat. § 595.02(5) (1953)
38. 235 Minn. 519, 51 N. W 2d 670 (1952)
[Vol. 40:347
A DEFENDANT'S VIEW
verbal information of the matter concerning which he ultimately will
be called to testify. Much valuable evidence is thereby lost upon the
nebulous theory that vital statistics are being created.
- DIscRETIoNARY EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE BY TRIAL JUDGE
Rule 45 allows the trial judge to exclude evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or con-
fusion. The rule is an excellent codification of the present practice.
It makes it clear that in the situation where there are numerous
parties, certain evidence ought to be excluded because of obvious
prejudice even though the evidence may be technically admissible
against some other party. Inherent in the rule is the idea that the
search for truth may be sometimes defeated by letting everything in.
The' last clause of the rule also allows the exclusion of evidence
if it "unfairly or harmfully" surprises a party. In most lawsuits,
the proper remedy in this situatioi would be a short delay in the trial
rather than exclusion of important though surprising evidence.
Probably the scope of this clause will be limited to the failure to
make discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure.A" Except per-
haps in the case of willful refusal to make discovery,' 0 if the surprise
may be cured by a delay in the trial, then the harsher remedy of
proceeding with the trial without the evidence should not be used.
INSURANCE
Rule 54 says that the existence of insurance is inadmissible to
prove negligence or wrongdoing. The rule is fine as far as it goes,
but it merely states an obvious matter. Insurance is "proof" of
nothing in the ordinary personal injury action."1 Will the rule be
interpreted as relaxing the present rule that insurance generally
should not be mentioned ?42 Rule 54 should be expanded to forbid
expressly the mention of liability insurance at any stage of the
proceeding except interrogation of the veniremen.
39. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26, 31,33,34 and 36.
40. See Evtush v. The Hudson Bus Transportation Co., 7 N. J. 167, 81
A. 2d 6 (1951) (testimony of undisclosed witness excluded).
41. Cf. Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N. W. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955), 40 Minn.
L. Rev. 183 (1956). -
42. In Minnesota, the jurors may be interrogated concerning their insur-
ance interests. Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, 108 N. W.
891 (1906) ; Scholte v. Brabec, 177 Minn. 13, 224 N. V. 259 (1929). But it is
improper for a defendant to disclose that he has no insurance, Brown v.
Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., 190 Minn. 81, 251 N. W 5 (1933). or that




FOUNDATION FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
Supposedly, Rule 58 abolishes the necessity of using a hypo-
thetical question in order to obtain an expert witness' opinion .
4
Actually, the rule allows an expert witness to give an opinion with-
out first going into the foundation of the opinion. The door is
opened for ipse dixit conclusions, and the only remedy is subsequent
cross-examination.
It is true that the hypothetical form of question occasionally be-
comes cumbersome and confusing. This rather limited evil is far
outweighed by the evil of letting a witness give his opinion to the
jury without anyone having the slightest idea of the reasoning of
the expert. In most instances under Rule 58, the opinion could be
given without objection. But, if it later develops that the opinion
is baseless or valueless, it is still in the case subject to be stricken.
As previously stated, things cannot really be stricken from the
minds of jurors by a command of the trial judge. If the jurors
should not consider an opinion, they should not hear it. In one
form or another, the expert should be required to specify or affirm
the various facts upon which his opinion is based before he is
allowed to give it. If the data is inaccurate, not supported by the
evidence, or otherwise defective, then the opinion should be ex-
cluded. Without some sort of preliminary protection, expert testi-
mony can and will run wild.
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
Rules 59 and 60 grant to the trial court the right to appoint an
expert who may testify."4 An elaborate procedure is set out. Counsel
must attend a hearing on the matter and later participate in a con-
ference with the court and the expert. If the parties cannot agree
on the matter, the court can act by itself. This procedure, long
advocated by academic attorneys, has found its way into Fed. R.
Crim. P 28.
Perhaps something may be said for this rule in civil cases where
the problem is within the purview of one of the more exact sciences
such as chemistry or physics. But even there, good faith disputes
may arise concerning analysis procedure and alternative theories.
In the field of medicine and other associated sciences, often enough
the problem is one upon which bona fide experts may properly
reach different opinions. The conservative frame of the legal mind
may be annoyed with the lack of exactitude in the natural sciences
(just as the natural scientists become impatient with the "wool-
43. For further discussion of this rule see companion article, Ladd,
p. 447
44. Id. at 450.
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spinning" of lawyers and judges), but that is no reason to pick some
expert, give him a halo of judicial approval, and let him offer his
opinions as superior pronouncements-which is the way the jury
will accept a court-appointed expert's testimony.
The simple fact is that there is no reason to believe that the
opinion of a court-appointed witness will be scientifically superior
to that of any other expert. Yet, there is no doubt that the jury will
give much greater weight to his opinions than those of other ex-
perts. Further, it is quite possible that the court-appointed expert
will merely aggravate the problem by offering a third opinion on the
matter in controversy, thus increasing the confusion rather than
reconciling it.
The most common example of conflict on expert testimony
occurs when physicians cannot agree concerning physical injuries.
Often, the defendant does not call a physician because his expert
substantially agrees with the plaintiff's medical witness. 45 If there is
a substantial disagreement, it may be due to partisanship or even
-the dishonesty of the particular expert. It may also be due to honest,
permissible differences of opinion. In most cases, these differences
should be analyzed and compared, not compounded by additional
honest and permissible differences of opinion. As for the dishonest
expert, he should be disciplined or weeded out by his own profes-
sional association.
Rules 59 and 60 should be modified to the extent that the court
may appoint an expert only if the parties agree on the need for it
and upon the group from which the court may select the expert.
HEARSAY
Rules 62-66 deal with the hearsay rule, its numerous catalogued
exceptions, and various other qualifications of the rule. It is beyond
the' scope of this article to discuss whether the hearsay rule should
be abolished in its entirety or retained or modified. Probably the
rule is here to stay, subject to a further relaxing of its application.
For those who dislike the hearsay rule in any form, the U. R. E. will
be undesirable since a codification tends to preserve and crystallize
the matter. Likewise, for those who believe in the policy considera-
tions behind the hearsay rule, this codification will be welcome.
For the practitioner who is never quite certain whether a bit of
hearsay is admissible or not, the list of thirty-one exceptions in
Rule 63 will be helpful.
45. It is interesting to note that plaintiff may comment on defendant's
failure to call his examining physician while defendant is foreclosed by our
present privilege statute from demonstrating that physicians which plaintiff
did not call did not agree with plaintiff.
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It is the authors' belief that the hearsay rule should be retained.
However, certain parts of the U R. E. on this point are con-
trary to existing practice in Minnesota and deserve comment.
Rule 63 (4) (c) permits the introduction of a statement narrat-
ing or describing an event if the declarant made the statement while
he still remembered the event well, and if the declarant is absent
under circumstances that are not suspicious. This rule adds bona
fide unavailability to death and insanity as a basis for the admission
of hearsay testimony In so doing, it adopts the theory of the Model
Code of Evidence46 that unavailability is the real basis for the
admission of hearsay testimony In most other situations, the
U R. E. does not follow the Model Code on this matter, but keeps
to the traditional idea that the circumstances of the statement are
crucial concerning admissibility However, Rule 63(4) (c), as
limited by Rule 62(7), does not permit the unrestricted use of hear-
say evidence upon the basis of absence. The statement must be made
before the lawsuit was started. The declarant must be absent from
the jurisdiction or cannot be found by due diligence. The absence
must be through no activity of the party, and no reasonable oppor-
tunity of taking his deposition must have existed. Under these
circumstances, the possibility of abuse in using this type of testimony
is greatly reduced. With careful administration, the rule may prove
to be a beneficial change in the law of evidence.
Rules 63(13) (14) concern business entries. In one important
respect, these rules may make quite a change. In Brown v St. Paid
City Ry. Co.4 7 the court held inadmissible a portion of the history
sheet of the hospital record of a patient. In so doing, it gave a special
interpretation to the Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act4 8
to the effect that hospital records, as business records, are admissible
to prove diagnosis, treatment and medical history, but that hearsay
and self-serving statements in the record are not admissible for
other purposes even though obtained as a regular part of the busi-
ness. The Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act contains no
such qualification. Will the result be changed by Rules 63(13) (14)
which specifically deal with hearsay and also contain no such quali-
fication ?
It is immaterial whether a business record, such as a hospital
sheet, contains self-serving hearsay or impeaching matters. Both
should be admissible because they were obtained and incorporated
46. A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence § 503(a).
47 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W 2d 688 (1954).
48. Minn. Stat. §§ 600.01-600.26 (1953).
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in a writing as a matter of regular business. If any business entry,
so obtained,.has a sufficient hallmark of truthfulness to be admissible
hearsay, then all such entries should be admitted. They are no
different than any other entry. Their truthfulness may be attacked,
but as part of the regular record they should be admitted unless un-
trustworthy on their face. It is hoped that Rules 64(13) (14) will
be interpreted as destroying the artificial rule of the Brown case.
Rule 64(31) would abolish the present Minnesota rule concern-
ing the use of textbooks.49 Under Rule 64(31), a treatise or writing
may be admitted as substantive evidence if the judge recognizes it
as authoritative or if an expert witness testifies that it is authorita-
tive. Under this rule, an expert witness may be cross-examined con-
cerning the contents of such a textbook if he could be so cross-
examined concerning the court room testimony of the author of
the book.
This rule is good insofar as it relaxes the restrictions on the
use of books on cross-examination. An expert witness should be
subject to cross-examination in reference to recognized authorities
whether or not he relies upon them or recognizes them. The
present Minnesota rule is much too limited. However, the use of
books as substantive evidence under Rule 64(31) would be bad.
If the writings of learned authors are material, they should be pre-
sented to the court only by the testimony of experts who vouch for
and understand the treatise, who can explain and apply the informa-
tion, and who can be cross-examined concerning discrepancies and
conflicts. The rule easily could degenerate into both sides sitting
and reading books to the enlightenment of no one and the confusion
of everyone-no matter how "authoritative" the books may be.
CONCLUSION
There has long been a need for a dear, simple codification of
the basic rules of evidence. The U. R. E. goes a long way in satisfy-
ing that need and marks a great advancement in the law. It is certain
that no one could draft a set of evidentiary rules which would satisfy
everyone. The U. R. E. is perhaps the closest approach to that ideal
situation which has yet been made. Its adoption, with various
modifications, should be seriously considered.
49. Zubryski v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 68 N. W. 2d 489 (Minn.
1955), Briggs v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 238 Minn. 472, 57 N. ,.
2d 572 (1953) ; Ruud v. Hendrnckson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N. V 904 (1929).
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